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ABSTRACT 
The paper examines the effect that the resolution of the naming dispute 
between North Macedonia and Greece has on the re-definition of the 
Macedonian nation. It discusses the narratives of supporters and opponents to 
the Prespa Agreement and poses the question of whether the European 
integration (under which auspices the name change occurred) has indeed 
served as new national mythology for Macedonians. 
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The SDSM- (Social Democratic Union of Macedonia) led government in the 
Republic of North Macedonia has been lauded by Western liberal forces as a bright 
example of progressive politics in the otherwise troublesome region of the 
Western Balkans. The government came to power in 2017 after an 11-year-long 
reign of the conservative VMRO-DPMNE (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization — Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity), which was 
characterized as “state capture” by Western critics. SDSM, along with its junior 
partners from the ethnic Albanian camp, formed the government after a long 
period of civil and partisan oppositional activism in the country, culminating with 
the Colorful Revolution in the summer of 201G. Though, without a doubt, 
challenged by the evergreen problems of systemic corruption, what earned the 
praise of Euro-Atlantic elites was the readiness of the new government to close the 
“big national questions,” all in the direction of integration into NATO and the EU. 
This strategy rests on three, very contentious, pillars: 
1. Fixing relations between the majority ethnic Macedonians and the less 
numerous ethnic Albanian community, mainly through a new law on 
languages, through which more extended linguistic rights would begiven. 
2. Improving relations with the neighbor to the east — Bulgaria — with the 
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purpose of gaining greater support in Euro-Atlantic integrations. 
3. Solving the 27-year-old “name issue” with the southern neighbor Greece, 
which has definitely impeded said integration, mainly through NATO. 
All three actions have produced some results. Following the signing of the 
agreement with Greece, the country was invited to join NATO, and is now waiting 
for the start of EU membership negotiations. The new law on languages entered 
into force and is facing practical challenges, as well as resistance from ethnic 
Macedonians. The Agreement for Friendship, Good Neighborly Relations and 
Cooperation between the Republic of Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia was 
signed on 1 August 2017 by the prime ministers of the two countries, ratified by 
both parliaments since. It provided for the establishment of bilateral expert 
commissions to discuss burning historical issues, and has produced much 
commotion, especially within the framework of European integration and 
Bulgaria’s pressures to resolve the issue of naming the “Macedonian language.” 
All three pillars have been opposed by VMRO-DPMNE, including non-partisan 
civil activists, and a radical left party — Levica (the Left) — which was born out of 
the anti–VMRO-DPMNE protests. 
This paper is dedicated to the most burning of the three issues — the resolution 
of the name disagreement with Greece, and the effects it is having on the 
citizenship definition and cleavages within the country. In particular, for the 
purposes of this volume, it discusses whether European integration might serve as 
a new national mythology for Macedonia. 
2. A  MULTI-ETHNIC  NATION? 
This paper is inspired by several statements of Prime Minister Zaev in which he 
speaks of a multi-ethnic nation. For the purposes of the dedicated volume, I use 
George Schöpflin’s chapter titled The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of 
Myths in the influential volume Myths and Nationhood (1997), edited by Schöpflin 
and Geoffrey Hosking. I use the case study of the referendum on the name change 
in Macedonia to put the two into communication. 
First, the controversial statements by Prime Minister Zaev. In 2019, Zaev 
received the Isa-Beg Ishaković International Award in Sarajevo in recognition of 
his work as he “significantly improved relations in the Western Balkans region,  
and demonstrated strong political leadership in the context of a more decisive 
region cooperation with the European Union and NATO” [Sarajevo Times, 2019]. 
During his receiving speech, he stated, “I and my multi-ethnic people [narod] are 
truly lucky” [ibid]. He continued along the same lines a few days later, in a greeting 
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address to Milo Đjukanović, his Montenegrin colleague from the sister party 
Democratic Party of Socialists: Zaev passed on the “warm greetings from the 
multi-ethnic Macedonian people” [Mirchevski, 2019]. These statements, quite 
expectedly, were severely criticized within the country. When asked to make a 
statement during a press conference on which people [narod] he referred to, he 
elaborated: 
The Macedonian people in the Republic of North Macedonia is the people of 
the Republic of North Macedonia. And it is multi-ethnic. It is composed of 
Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Roma, Bosniaks, Serbs and all the 
others who live in it. So the phrase the multi-ethnic people of Macedonia, or of 
the Republic of North Macedonia is the term we are now using. I use it on 
purpose because I believe that we are a multi-ethnic country with multi-ethnic 
people, but we are still all Macedonian people. Who belongs to the Republic of 
North Macedonia [Sarajevo Times 2019]. 
Returning to the issue of mythology, what I would like to explore in this paper 
is whether this multi-ethnic nation is truly being formed, with the Euro-Atlantic 
integration as a central founding myth. To understand this more clearly, I use 
Schöpflin’s understanding of myth, as it is “one of the ways in which collectivities 
— […] nations — establish and determine the foundations of their own being, their 
own systems of morality and values” [Schöpflin, 1997: 19] and would like to see 
whether for the Macedonian nation, the compromise with Greece, especially done 
under the auspices of European integration, establishes a new myth. Schöpflin 
continues with a statement that, in this day and age, might be too monolithic for 
the establishing of new mythologies; he says that “myth is a set of beliefs, usually 
put forth as a narrative, held by a community about itself” [ibid.]. I doubt that the 
whole community will hold this myth to be true, even in the short term. However, 
what is important here is the tendency for the establishment of new mythologies. 
Like any mythologies, national myths need not be validated by historical truth, but 
rather perceptions are at the forefront. Schöpflin notes, however, that myths are 
not about falsehoods and perceptions, since communities might be aware they are 
not rooted within historical facts. Content, therefore, is of vital importance. To 
finalize with Schöpflin’s words in this section: “Myth is, then, a key element in the 
creation of closures and the constitution of collectivities. At the heart of this 
argument is the proposition that myth is vital in the establishment of coherence, in 
the making of thought-worlds that appear clear and logical, in the maintenance of 
discourses and generally in making cosmos out of chaos.” [ibid: 20] 
European integration in the Western Balkans has taken some of the qualities 
of mythology, and the desirability of membership has not been disputed by the 
political mainstream throughout the problematic transitions. As it will be seen, 
the resolution of the naming dispute invariably influences the identity of the 
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people inhabiting what is now called North Macedonia. However, this bitter pill  
to swallow has been justified precisely through the promise of a better life under 
NATO membership and, more specifically, the European Union. Thus, the central 
question of this paper is this: is Macedonia’s Euro-Atlantic integration a key 
element in new national mythology? 
The question will be explored through the contention arising from the process 
of changing the name, and the referendum in particular. 
 
3. THE CONTEXT OF THE AGREEMENT 
The Prespa Agreement, signed on 12 June 2018, ended a 27-year-old dispute 
between Greece and Macedonia. In short, after the declaration of independence 
from the Yugoslav Federation, the newly established Republic of Macedonia faced 
difficulties of recognition, primarily from its southern neighbour, Greece. The 
Greek administration of the time purported that the very usage of the name 
“Macedonia” meant territorial pretensions, considering that it coincided with the 
name of its northern region of the same name, even though the name of the 
country had been Federal or the Socialist Republic as part of Yugoslavia since the 
end of World War II. Seeing no way out, the Macedonian side accepted being taken 
into the United Nations under the provisional name The Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), provided that the two countries would hold 
talks on a permanent solution to the naming dispute. This very issue has been a 
potent breeding ground for heightened nationalism on both sides of the border in 
the years to come. 
Despite the obvious problem, the two countries cooperated, especially in the 
economic field, very successfully, while the UN, under special negotiator Matthew 
Nimetz, sought to help the parties overcome the differences on the name. 
Following a Greek-initiated veto on a NATO membership for Macedonia in 2008, 
the VMRO-DPMNE government (200G–2017) used a well-known strategy of 
increasing popular support —increasing nationalism. The core of the issue was 
that the use of the word Macedonia in the Republic of Macedonia meant that the 
country and its people laid claim on the ancient kingdom of Macedon, along with 
its most famous ruler Alexander the Great. Even though such a sentiment was 
present, practically the identity of Macedonians had always been connected to 
Slavic culture. However, the VMRO-DPMNE government engaged in a 
redefinition of national identity. Though predominantly Slavic, it moved ancient 
Macedonian identity to the forefront, primarily through architecture, i.e. the 
controversial Skopje 2014 project, when a giant statue of Alexander was built on 
the square, along with the entire royal family and buildings in a 
neoclassical/baroque style. 
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After the change of government, and with increased support and pressures 
from both EU and US representatives, as well as by considering the specificities of 
the Greek government of the time, the agreement was finally reached. In short, 
the new name of the country would be the Republic of North Macedonia, both 
internationally and within the country. The language remains Macedonian, but 
with an emphasis that it belongs to the family of Slavic languages, while the 
citizenship is designated as Macedonian/of the Republic of North Macedonia. 
Considering the national consensus among all mainstream parties that once an 
agreement with Greece is reached, the solution would have to go to a referendum; 
this option was granted by the agreement itself. The date for the referendum was 
set for 30 September 2018, setting the scene for a tense summer in political terms. 
The question for the referendum read: “Are you in favour of NATO and EU 
membership through accepting the Agreement with Greece?” Highly contested, 
the question was set this way to suggest that the name change is for no other 
reason than to lift the Greek veto preventing accession to international 
organizations due to the existing problem. 
 
4. THE EXISTING CLEAVAGES 
In this paper, I claim that we are witnessing in Macedonia two opposing 
mythologies that continuously divide society into two monolithic camps. Whereas 
the right-wing mythology of VMRO-DPMNE and affiliated organizations seek to 
represent the “people” in an ethno-nationalist sense, the left-wing mythology of 
SDSM and its affiliates claim to represent the “citizens” in a multi-ethnic state. 
Both camps claim to represent Macedonian citizens on a large scale. Both camps 
have supporting media that exacerbate this understanding of their constituencies, 
however, similarly, they may act with only minor differences in wording. 
Furthermore, I claim that two parallel civil societies exist today — one, already 
established and modelled based on Western imaginations of civil societies in 
transition, and another, in its birth, as an antithesis to the previous one (could be 
labelled “uncivil”). In the attempt of establishing a populist chain of equivalences, 
the two civil societies have a different definition of their constituencies. The left- 
wing civil society represents the “citizens” — a multi-ethnic, vigilant, aware, and 
pro-Western citizenry, with an orientation towards the substantive understanding 
of democracy. On the other hand, the right-wing civil society represents the 
“people” — largely ethnically Macedonian; proud, resistant to the “corrupt West,” 
and with a clear preference to the procedural, majoritarian understanding of 
democracy. 
Whatever had been started during the rule of VMRO-DPMNE in 200G-2017, 
the referendum on the name change has strengthened and clarified. 
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5. THE  EUROPEAN  (NORTH)  MACEDONIANS 
The question itself implied the direction of the Yes campaign. The main slogan 
used by this camp was “For a European Macedonia.” On campaign rallies, internet  
campaigns and TV appearances (headed by Prime Minister Zoran Zaev) Yes 
campaigners primarily spoke of the benefits of membership. 
NATO membership gained some attention, expectedly in the direction of 
better security, as being a part of a larger family and being in a military alliance 
with neighbours: Greece, Bulgaria, and Albania. Security is particularly important 
because of the memories of the 2001 conflict between state armed forces and 
ethnic Albanian insurgents. The ever potent perception of “threat” from Albanian 
nationalism and separatism was used both informally and formally, posing the 
imperative that these “appetites” would be finally settled once the country entered  
NATO. 
The EU, on the other hand, was dominating the campaign as a powerful 
strategic goal of the country and its citizens. It was approached in both a 
civilizational and practical way. The civilizational aspect was that Macedonia had 
always been a part of Europe, both geographically and culturally, thus we would 
need to remove any obstacles impeding us from it. This notion was always 
juxtaposed to the East, especially Russia. Thus, the dichotomy emerged between 
the Europe of democracy, human rights and high culture, and the East, like Russia 
and Turkey, i.e. autocracies and models of the past. 
In practical issues, the story was told through both truthful and augmented 
representations of what the EU might mean for Macedonian citizens. Much like 
an electoral campaign, it was presented that the Yes vote would bring more 
employment, better-paid jobs, the opening of new markets, mobility for the youth, 
even free healthcare in Europe. Most importantly, European integration meant an 
end to the “voting by feet,” i.e. would stop people from migrating out of the 
country for economic reasons. This aspect, however, was coupled with the identity 
question as well. 
For ethnic Macedonians, the primary and easiest exit ticket from the country 
was getting a Bulgarian passport since Bulgaria is an EU member state. The 
question of Bulgaria is the other contentious issue for Macedonian identity, after 
the Greek one. Besides Greece and the naming issue, Macedonia has conflicting 
national mythology with Bulgaria at its core. Bulgarian historiography states that 
the Macedonian nation, language, culture and identity do not exist as separate 
entities, but are essentially Bulgarian. Thus, for a Macedonian national to receive 
Bulgarian citizenship, one should sign a notarized statement that they are 
Bulgarian, along with all their ancestors. Thus, whenever a Yes campaigner would 
say that EU membership would stop people from wanting to move out, it also 
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meant stopping Macedonians from becoming Bulgarian and keeping the 
Macedonian identity. The name change should be a sweet pill to swallow then. 
The composition of the Yes camp was the following: 
• SDSM supporters, since it was signed by this party in power. Overall, 
these voters tend to be less nationalistic, more multi-ethnic and more 
enthusiastically pro-European. 
• Supporters of ethnic Albanian parties, since all of them (both 
opposition and incumbent) publicly supported the agreement. Ethnic 
Albanians are less emotionally involved in the name issue and have 
continuously claimed that NATO and EU were the most important 
strategic goals for them, even at the expense of conflict, especially 
after Albania entered NATO. 
• Less numerous ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Roma, Aromanians, etc.), for 
similar reasons like Albanians. 
• A significant part of Colorful Revolution participants, since their 
definition of citizenship, coincided with the EU idea. 
 
G. THE MACEDONIANS OF “BOYCOTT” 
Practically, an “Against” campaign did not materialize. Rather, from the onset, 
boycott was seen as the only option for the opponents of the agreement. The 
explanation why boycott was the preferred option holds several layers: 
• By law, a referendum is only successful if a 50% quorum is reached. Having 
in mind the enormous success of SDSM at the local elections of the previous 
year, coupled with the support by Albanians and other ethnic communities, 
opponents were not certain that there would be more votes against than for. 
Electoral math supported this claim. Roughly 1.8 million voters are on the 
voting list, according to the State Electoral Commission. The list has been 
contested for years but has not been cleaned yet. It does not help either that 
the country has not held a census since 2002. Usually, there are no more 
than 1.2 million voters at elections due to migration and political disinterest. 
Thus, putting the apathetic and those unable to vote (being abroad, etc.) 
together with those opposing the agreement would prove successful in the 
creation of a picture that more people oppose the agreement. 
• The second reason why boycott was simply rhetoric was that they did not 
want to decide. In the words of one of my informants: “Our ancestors fought  
and died and voted for this country in the present form. This name is given 
to us as a legacy. I do not have the right to vote in any way on this. This 
question cannot be.” For boycotters, it was considered a bad solution that 
should not be legitimized. 
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• The third reason was simply institutional distrust. According to boycotters, 
if you vote, you have no guarantees that it would not simply be counted as a 
‘yes.’ If you boycott, it is more difficult for them to fake it! 
• Finally, the fourth reason was the name itself. For boycotters, the name was 
manipulative and contained a whole matrix of possible answers, one that 
should not be answered. 
The symbolic production of the boycott camp indicates the birth of the 
Macedonian alt-right: Nationalism coupled with institutional distrust and anti- 
establishment politics. The boycott campaign never said it would stop there, but 
rather that it would continue to fight against the current government and take 
back the country. In addition, Steve Bannon and Pepe the Frog were used as 
symbols. Thus, the move to change the name was presented as part of the globalist 
conspiracy headed by the deep state, epitomized through George Soros and his 
puppets in the EU. Hashtags such as #deepstate, #bannon, #Qanon, were used to 
give it international context, and to show the Macedonian struggle as one worthy 
of solidarity with other peoples fighting globalist powers. The moral argument 
went that the name change was genocide against Macedonians. Considering that 
the EU supported it, it also fits within the story of building refugee camps in the 
country. At the final rally, protesters wore David’s stars on their sleeves, to show 
the parallel between the Macedonian name genocide and the Holocaust. 
Most interestingly, the boycott campaign employed populist tactics more 
successfully than the ‘yes camp’. Boycott emerged as the empty signifier arising 
from an equivalent chain of a plethora of sedentary and current grievances.  
According to its participants, Boycott was the culmination of national deficiencies, 
such as criminal transition and offended national pride with relations to Greece, 
Bulgaria, and the Albanians. On the other hand, Boycott was also a resistance 
against the global conspiracy, so Macedonia fought for conserving Christian 
Europe from the globalists and Muslim migrants. In addition, if you had 
boycotted, it would mean that you also reacted against current scandals. Such was 
the dubious distribution of innovation grants to companies close to government 
officials, or the fact that the daughter of the foreign affairs minister has won a 
governmental scholarship to study in the Netherlands. Finally, it also meant that 
you were angry with the mayor of Skopje for not having fought against the scourge 
of mosquitoes during the summer well enough. 
The composition of Boycott was primarily ethnic Macedonian, the majority 
belonging to various right-wing organizations: 
• The most vocal was a coalition of smaller, newly formed political parties 
and formal and informal civil society groups, with the United Macedonia 
being the most notable of all, which was a direct copy of Putin’s United 
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Russia with blunt pro-Russian sentiments. They were joined by the World 
Macedonian Congress, an umbrella organization of diaspora groups. 
Furthermore, they were supported by newer right-wing groups such as the 
Hardcores (Tvrdokorni) and the Christian Brotherhood. 
• The main opposition party, VMRO-DPMNE, played a tricky role. Being 
vocally against, they never called for a boycott, but insisted that everyone 
should act “in accordance to their conscience.” In the field, however, it was 
obvious to the members that an unofficial direction was still to boycott. 
• The most significant “transfer” from the Colorful Revolution to Boycott 
was Levica — the Left — a radical left-wing party, born out of anti–VMRO- 
DPMNE protests. According to them, the agreement endangered the fight 
for self-determination, it was imperialistic, and anyways, the country 
should not join NATO. This coalition produced some unexpected results, 
such as Hardcores, a proto-fascist organization, supporting and promoting 
events in a leftist social centre with anarchist bands, just because they were 
anti-NATO. 
 
7. THE REFERENDUM OUTCOME 
On 30 September 2018, only 3G.9 percent of voters participated in the 
referendum, 91.4% of whom were in favour of the agreement. It meant that out of 
the 1.8 million official voters only about G00,000 supported the name change [BBC 
News 2018]. Both sides declared victory. Since it was merely a consultative 
referendum, and since the voter list was not valid, the Yes camp, i.e. the 
government, would proclaim that the numbers showed a clear indication of the 
general will. Thus, they would go ahead with constitutional changes. 
Boycott, on the other hand, also celebrated. Considering only 37% voted, they 
believed that 1.2 million people opposed the agreement, thus the government has 
lost its mandate to continue pursuing its goal. After the law on languages and the 
agreement with Bulgaria, this was the first time one could see the Macedonian 
right-wing celebrate on the streets. They pledged to prevent further enactment 
of the agreement, and are currently pushing for resignation and trial of the 
government for high treason. Boycott has turned into Resign and Arrest. 
As previously mentioned, this referendum solidified cleavages in the 
Macedonian political spectrum, with one significant change: that of the Left. It 
also gives the rise to the Macedonian alt-right, as a prominent part of the wider 
right-wing movements. 
8. THE NEW MYTHOLOGY DISCUSSED: A CONCLUSION 
When discussing the functions of myths, Schöpflin sees it as an instrument of 
self-definition, membership and rules, world view, and boundaries of the 
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community [Schöpflin, 1997] According to this understanding, the new mythology 
in North Macedonia would be that of a multi-ethnic European nation, one that 
would espouse in its citizens the values of the progressive politics of the EU, and 
with a membership which would distinguish it from other, non–European Union 
nations. In this sense, it is visionary mythology that expects an “easing” of 
nationalist narratives at the expense of European ones, even amongst its 
neighbours. In opposition to this, protesters against the new name choose to keep 
the boundaries as they are, with a clearly defined Macedonian nation within the 
state. 
Myth can be an instrument of identity transfer [ibid.], as a new identity can be 
superimposed on an older one. Following this, it can be suitable for ethnically 
different groups to be brought closer or even assimilate together. In the case of 
North Macedonia, the new mythology would build an identity past the ethnic and 
religious diversity that exists at the moment. This would be a European identity, 
holding the mythology of the process of European integration, in particular by 
accepting the name change, as well as the new law on languages. This would, 
consequently, alleviate the inter-ethnic tensions threatening to destabilize the 
country. This European identity is exactly what the other side is fearful of: the loss 
of any domination for ethnic Macedonians and the superimposed increase of 
domination by other communities, particularly Muslim Albanians, under the guise 
of European, multi-ethnic nationhood. 
Another, very interesting observation that Schöpflin makes about mythologies is 
that “of offering explanations for the fate of a community, for accounting for failure, 
for the negative outcomes of particular strategies” [ibid: 25] Especially regarding 
failures, this aspect of mythologies can lead to conspiracy theories. The fact that the 
Macedonian nation has identitarian issues with several of its neighbours, has been 
strengthening conspiracy theories, especially among the opponents to the 
agreement. According to them, the name Macedonia is too glorious, and the 
Macedonians, as Alexander the Great’s descendants, have to fight to preserve it. 
Since all neighbours are against the nation, it means that there has to be some sort 
of global conspiracy to crush the nation. The name issue with Greece has, not 
without some accuracy, been used as a constant reason why the country could not 
progress economically and politically. Its resolution, however, can be used by the 
other side, as a founding event in the birth of the new European nation, not only 
attributing all future improvements in life to it, but also with a clear delineation 
where the fault might be if things are tough. 
To finalize, Schöpflin writes that the myth needs to have the strength to 
mobilize, it needs to resonate. It is open to question whether the new mythology 
of a European multi-ethnic Macedonian nation, with the founding event of the 
name agreement with Greece, would survive, or will continue to be alien to most 
of the community. The numbers showed that, in a nation of roughly two million 
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inhabitants, more than G00,000 supported it. Even though boycotters claim that 
1.2 million (out of the complete voter lists), are against it and wish to keep things 
as they are. The conflict between these two mythologies will continue to shape 
Macedonian politics in the coming years. 
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